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CHAPTER 10 
Corrections and Prisoners' Rights 
MARTIN C. GIDEONSE* 
§ 10.1. Parole Eligibility- Aggregation of Sentences. A small addition 
to the literature on the metaphysics of sentence calculation is to be found in 
Durham v. Massachusetts Parole Board. 1 It was already established that in 
general an inmate who happened to receive consecutive sentences, whether 
for related or unrelated crimes, was entitled to "aggregate" the parole 
eligibility times on the consecutive sentences in order to determine a single 
date for parole eligibility, obviating a need for a meaningless interim parole 
grant from one sentence to another. 2 Drawing upon a rarely extant source, 
legislative history, as well as the statutory language of General Laws chapter 
127, section 133(c),3 Durham recognizes an exception to the Henschel ag-
gregation principle when an inmate is facing a sentence for a crime com-
mitted while on parole, and where the sentence for that parole crime is im-
posed from and after the expiration of the sentence from which he was 
paroled.• 
The plaintiff began serving his sentence on July 14, 1969 and on 
December 18, 1970 Durham was released on parole.' Upon revocation of 
his parole, the plaintiff was returned to custody on March 6, 1975. 6 On Oc-
tober 2, 1975 he received a new sentence for the crime committed while on 
parole, to take effect from and after his original sentence.' On May 6, 1978 
• MARTIN C. GIDEONSE practices law in Cambridge. Mr. Gideonse also teaches trial 
practice at Harvard Law School, where he is also the supervising attorney for the Harvard 
Prison Legal Assistance Project. 
§ 10.1. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 326, 416 N.E.2d 954. 
' See Henschel v. Commissioner of Correction, 368 Mass. 130, 330 N.E.2d 480 (1975). 
' G.L. c. 127, § 133(c) provides: 
Parole permits may be granted by the parole board to prisoners subject to its jurisdic-
tion at such time as the board in each case may determine; provided ... (c) that no 
prisoner held under a sentence containing a minimum sentence for a crime committed 
while on parole shall receive a parole permit until he shall have served two thirds of such 
minimum sentence, or, if he has two or more sentences to be served otherwise than con-
currently for offences committed while on parole, two thirds of the aggregate of the 
minimum terms of such several sentences, but in any event not less than two years for 
each such sentence. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 330-32, 416 N.E.2d at 957-58. 
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he finished serving his 1969 sentence, rendering him ineligible for parole on 
the 1975 sentence until May 5, 1982.1 What Durham argued was that by ag-
gregating the minimum terms of both sentences his date of parole eligibility 
really was September 30, 1979.' He sought a declaratory judgment that he 
was eligible for parole and an order that he be afforded a parole release 
hearing. 10 A superior court judge granted this relief, whereupon the defend-
ant parole board moved for and received a stay of the judgment and order 
until resolution on appeal. 11 
The statute mandates serving two-thirds of the parole crime sentence. 12 
Since an inmate cannot be deemed to be serving that sentence until the 
original sentence either expires by parole or otherwise, under Durham an in-
mate who is sentenced for a parole crime, from and after, must either serve 
the entire first sentence, or successfully go through the motions of the 
parole hearing on the original sentence before the clock may tick for real 
parole eligibility. 
The Court characterized the inmate's claim in Durham as asking that he 
be permitted to have, in essence, "banked" parole eligibility time prior to 
the imposition of sentence on the parole crime, during the period he was 
either incarcerated on the original sentence, even though parole eligible on 
that sentence, or while he was peaceably on parole from that sentence. 13 
Since the case reports that the inmate received a six to ten year sentence on 
October 2, 1975, a parole crime sentence on which parole eligibility is two-
thirds of the minimum time, and Durham is also reported to have asserted 
his new parole eligibility to be September 30, 1979, the Court's characteriza-
tion of Durham's claim may be somewhat misleading. However Durham 
himself may have framed the question, the Court explicitly leaves open the 
more interesting question, whether the parole board practice of not even 
beginning to count parole eligibility on the parole crime sentence until the 
expiration of the earlier sentence by parole or otherwise, was justified, 14 or 
whether parole eligibility on the "parole" crime sentence should start upon 
the imposition of that sentence. 
The policy underlying the Henschel aggregation principle should apply to 
from and after sentences imposed for parole crimes. Absent aggregation, 
the parole board must make a series of parole decisions, a "procedure 
• Id. at 327-28, 416 N.E.2d at 955. 
• Id. at 328, 416 N.E.2d at 955-56. 
•• /d. at 328, 416 N.E.2d at 956. 
" /d. at 328, 328 n.5, 416 N.E.2d at 956, 956 n.4. 
12 See G.L. c. 127, § 133(a) which applies to assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, the crime the plaintiff was convicted of on both occasions. 19!!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
327, 416 N.E.2d at 955. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 329, 416 N.E.2d at 956. 
•• /d. at 332-33 n.7, 416 N.E.2d at 958 n.7. 
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[which] makes little sense since the decision to grant parole is to be based on 
whether the board believes the prisoner can live freely outside of prison 
without violating the law." 1' 
Section 133 of chapter 127 does not foreclose applying that principle. 
Subsection (a) establishes parole eligibility at two-thirds of the aggregated 
minimum time for sentences imposed for certain specific crimes; subsection 
(b) sets parole eligibility at one-third of the aggregated minimum time for all 
other crimes; subsection (c) simply sets a two-thirds eligibility for inmates 
based on offender characteristic (i.e. parole status at the time of commis-
sion of the crime) rather than offense characteristic. The Durham exception 
could, moreover, lead to the odd result that a parolee who is sentenced for a 
parole crime, but who happened to have remained at large pending disposi-
tion of the parole offense, may be more leniently treated in terms of 
ultimate parole eligibility, than one whose parole was revoked prior to the 
disposition of the parole crime. 
§ 10.2. &cape - Necessity. There was good news and bad news in the 
Survey year for prisoners charged with escape. 1 The good news is that the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Thurber2 recognized that 
necessity, as distinct from compulsion based upon duress or coercion, might 
negate criminal purpose as an essential element in the context of prison 
escapes. 3 Moreover, where the evidence fairly raises an issue as to necessity, 
the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was 
no necessity. 4 
The bad news is that the circumstances required to establish necessity are 
relatively constrained and the Supreme Judicial Court approved the exercise 
of wide discretion in the trial judge's employment of hypotheticals il-
lustrating those circumstances. The relevant circumstances include a 
specific threat of death, of forcible sexual attack or of substantial bodily in-
jury in the immediate future, no time available for a complaint to the prison 
authorities or a history of futile complaints, no time for resort to courts, no 
evidence of force or violence towards prison personnel or other "innocent" 
persons in the course of the escape, and an immediate report to the proper 
authorities upon attaining a position of safety from the immediate threat.' 
" 368 Mass. at 136, 330 N.E.2d at 484. 
§ 10.2. ' G.L. c. 268, § 16 provides, in part: 
A prisoner who escapes or attempts to escape from any penal institution other than 
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Framingham, or from land appurtenant 
thereto, or from the custody of any officer thereof or while being conveyed to or from 
any such institution, may be pursued and recaptured and shall be punished. . .. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 880, 418 N.E.2d 1253. 
' Id. at 882, 418 N.E.2d at 1256. 
• /d. at 883, 418 N.E.2d at 1256. 
' /d. at 882, 418 N.E.2d at 1256 (relying on People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App.3d 823, 
3
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In the course of charging the jury on necessity, the trial judge invited the 
jury to consider whether or not, if the inmate had gone over the wall by 
means of a ladder and had pulled the ladder up with him, the necessity had 
ended at that point, or whether or not, having gone twenty feet from the 
wall, he was now in a position of safety and had a viable alternative to con-
tinuing the escape. 6 Implying that escape is a form of continuing crime, the 
Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the hypotheticals adequately stated 
the principle that the escape could be justified by necessity only so long as 
the necessity continued. 7 
The Court's opinion, although complete, does not seriously address 
"[t]he real question presented in this case ... [of] whether the prisoner 
should be punished for helping to extricate himself from a situation where 
society has abdicated completely its basic responsibility for providing an en-
vironment free of life threatening conditions .... "• In this case, the 
defendant presented evidence that certain guards and inmates at the 
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord planned and attempted 
to take his life in retaliation for reporting the beating of an inmate by a 
guard.' Such an episode is not uncommon in modem prisons. 10 Yet the 
Court adopted the same continuing offense theory as the United States 
Supreme Court did in a federal escape case in United States v. Bailey, 11 re-
quiring an escapee to tum himself in as soon as he is free of an immediate 
threat. 12 Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court approved of an instruction 
inviting the jury to consider the necessity terminated once the inmate was 
over the wall, but not mentioning the fact that "the escapee, realistically, 
faces a high probability of being returned to the same prison and to exactly 
the same, or even greater, threats to life and safety." 13 It is hoped that the 
burden of proof analysis of the Thurber Court will provide for the just 
resolution of prison escape cases. 
§ 10.3. Involuntary Medical Treatment - Need for Court Order? In 
Commonwealth v. Myers 1 the Supreme Judicial Court rejected a suggestion 
of mootness for an inmate who had, between the entry of a superior court 
order authorizing involuntary life saving treatment and the time of argu-
831-32 (1974)). 
' Id. at 884, 418 N.E.2d at 12S7. 
' Id. at 885, 418 N.E.2d at 1257. 
' United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 424 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 418 N.E.2d at 1255. 
" United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 422. 
" 444 U.S. 394 (1980). The Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976). 
" Id. at 413-15. The Court made no distinction between duress and necessity. Id. at 410. 
" Id. at 427 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
§ 10.3. ' 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). 
4
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ment of the appeal before the Supreme Judicial Court, voluntarily taken the 
required treatment. The Court approved a balancing test for rendering in-
voluntary treatment. 2 The Court, in other circumstances, had already iden-
tified four countervailing state interests to be weighed against acknowledg-
ing an individual's right to exercise his or her own private judgment with 
respect to treatment: "(1) the preservation of life, (2) protection of interests 
of innocent third parties, (3) the prevention of suicide, and (4) the preserva-
tion of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. m In Myers, the 
Supreme Judicial Court added a fifth state interest, the state's interest in 
upholding orderly prison administration. 4 
During the Survey year, the Court refused to answer a further question 
posed by the Commissioner of Corrections in Commissioner of Corrections 
v. Ferguson, ' namely, whether the Commissioner was required to obtain 
prior judicial approval before administering life saving treatment to a non-
consenting inmate. The Court found the question moot. 6 Not only had the 
prisoner evidently voluntarily taken treatment, and had been paroled, but 
he had neither briefed nor argued the question as reported to the Supreme 
Judicial Court by the superior court judge before whom the Commission 
had sought a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief. 7 
Ferguson represents a particularly apt application of the doctrine of 
mootness, not simply because nobody appeared to argue "the other side" 
of the question before the court. From the point of view both of inmates 
and of prison administrators, an answer either way to the reported question 
might create difficulty. Prison administrators should perhaps focus on 
developing internal procedures which effectively distinguish between gen-
uine emergencies requiring life-saving treatment and those cases evoking ~ 
paternal imposition of prescribed treatment, as opposed to seeking a carte 
blanche order at the risk of inviting unwanted and detailed judicial interven-
tionism. 
§ 10.4. Overcrowding - Execudve and Judicial Powers. Another at-
tempt by penal authorities to seek judicial guidance on a prospective prob-
lem, as perceived by them, foundered on the twin shoals of mootness and 
lack of standing in Penal Institutions Commissioner for Suffolk County v. 
Commissioner of Correction. 1 Claiming that overcrowded conditions at 
' /d. at 260-62, 399 N.E.2d at 455-56. 
• Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 
417, 425 (1977). 
• 379 Mass. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 457. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1252, 421 N.E.2d 444. 
• /d. at 1254, 421 N.E.2d at 446. 
7 /d. 
§ 10.4. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 361, 416 N.E.2d 958. 
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Deer Island House of Corrections, plus the expected impact of a planned 
program of renovation, would create conditions so severe as to constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment, the penal institution's Commissioner of Suf-
folk County sought a court order requiring the Commissioner of Correc-
tions for the Commonwealth to transfer inmates from Deer Island under 
the Commonwealth Commissioner's powers. 2 No attempt having been 
made even to discuss the possible problem with the Commonwealth Com-
missioner of Corrections, the Supreme Judicial Court was unable to fmd 
that there was any actual controversy between the respective Commis-
sioners., Moreover, the Court found "perverse" the notion that the penal 
Commissioner, the official most directly responsible for preventing the in-
fringement of any constitutional rights as a result of conditions, had stand-
ing to vindicate that right before a tribunal. 4 Perverse may be too harsh a 
word, given the realities of well intentioned prison authorities caught be-
tween a rock and a hard place, and given the practicalities of enforcing, or 
vindicating, such rights. Whether or not "perverse," there was, as the 
Court recognized, no clear identity of interest between those who possessed 
such constitutional rights, the inmates and those who sought to vindicate.' 
The Supreme Judicial Court also put a stop to an attempt by the superior 
court, acting perhaps in collusion with the Commissioner of Corrections, to 
alleviate overcrowding in state correctional institutions by remanding per-
sons sentenced to state prison to county houses of corrections, without hav-
ing obtained the consent of the concerned County Sheriff. 6 In its Sheriff of 
Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Corrections ruling, 7 the Court nar-
rowly defmed the powers of the superior court when faced with over-
crowded facilities, even though the Court agreed "that inmate population 
levels in excess of the capacity of correctional institutions increase the risks 
of danger to the public, to the inmates, and to the correctional staff."' 
Not particularly concerned that traditionally only inmates serving a given 
sentence could challenge sentences allegedly at variance with the sentences 
prescribed by the legislature, and ignoring the standing question addressed 
in Penals Institutions Commissioner, the Court found that even the aid of a 
2 /d. at 362-63, 416 N.E.2d .at 9S9-60. Under O.L. c. 124, § 1(g) 
" ... the commissioner of correction ... shall ... (g) determine at the time of commit-
ment, and from time to time thereafter, the custody requirements and program needs of 
each person committed to the custody of the department and assign or transfer such 
persons to appropriate facilities and programs." 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 36S, 416 N.E.2d at 961. 
• Id. at 366, 416 N.E.2d at 962. 
' /d. at 366-67, 416 N.E.2d at 962. 
• Sheriff of Middlesex County v. Commissioner of Corrections, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 122S, 
1226, 421 N.E.2d 7S, 76. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 122S, 421 N.E.2d 7S. 
• /d. at 1227, 421 N.E.2d at 76. 
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superior court order of remand to a house of correction for one who would 
otherwise be a state prisoner was insufficient to circumvent the statutory re-
quirement under chapter 127, section 97 of the General Laws9 that the Com-
missioner's power to make such a transfer required a Sheriff's approval. 10 
The Court also stated that absent any emergency with constitutional im-
plications the superior court does not have judicial power to override the 
clear statutory requirement, under chapter 279, section 23 11 that no sentence 
awarded a male prisoner in excess of two and a half years be executed in a 
house of correction. 12 The Court found support for its statutory interpreta-
tion in the doctrine of the separation of powers, the judiciary not being 
properly concerned with ongoing conditions of confinement. 13 
The Court's twin 1981 decisions affecting institutional overcrowding 
reveal a real reluctance to encourage judicial involvement, although these 
decisions can hardly be characterized as overly technical. Nevertheless, the 
Court was careful to point out in both cases that a constitutional attack, if 
properly raised, probably would be considered. Given the Court's conserv-
ative tenor on this issue, however, and in light of the United States Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, •• it appears unlikely that in-
mates will easily succeed in a due process or cruel and unusual punishment 
clause attack!' 
Both of these cases, as well as the Ferguson case discussed above, provide 
little guidance for the practitioner faced with the Scylla of mootness, on the 
one hand, and the Charybdis of complex class actions, on the other. Over 
any period of time, inmates tend to be transferred, paroled, or forgiven 
• G.L. c. 127, § 97 provides, in part: 
The commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one correctional institu-
tion of the commonwealth to another, and with the approval of the sheriff or of the 
county from any such institution except a prisoner serving a life sentence to any jail or 
house of correction, or a sentenced prisoner from any jail or house of correction to any 
such institution except the state prison, or from any jail or house of correction to any 
other jail or house of correction. 
For some of the development of this statute see McGrath, Criminal Law, Procedure and Ad-
ministration, 1955 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 12.10, at 128-29; McGrath, Criminal Law, Pro-
cedure and Administration, 1962 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§§ 11.3 and 11.6, at 125 and 128-31. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1228-29, 421 N.E.2d at 77-78. 
" G.L. c. 279, § 23 provides: 
"No sentence of a male convict to imprisonment or confinement for more than two 
and one half years shall be executed in any jail or house of correction." 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1229, 421 N.E.2d at 77. 
" /d. at 1229-30, 421 N.E.2d at 77-78. 
14 101 s. Ct. 2392 (1981). 
" For a thorough discussion of overcrowding and the eighth amendment in the federal 
courts see, e.g., Note, Prison Overcrowding and Rhodes v. Chapman: Double-Ceiling By 
What Standard?, 23 B.C. L. REv. 713 (1982). For a discussion of solutions to overcrowding 
generally see, e.g., Note, Relief for Prison Overcrowding: Evaluating Michigan's Accelerated 
Parole Statute, 15 UNIV. OF MICH. J. OF LAW REFORM 547 (1982). 
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disciplinary sanctions, not always for reasons unrelated to the fact that 
litigation has been bruited about, or commenced. A stringent application of 
the doctrine of mootness results in many arguable but systematic and 
systemic abuses being elusive subjects for litigation. Well-phrased gentle 
hints to correctional officials are all too likely to fall on deaf ears. 16 Class 
actions, under Rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, are a 
ponderous weapon with which to attack abuse, and, particularly in respect 
to the framing of effective relief, may lead to "over-lawyering." In either 
case, real plaintiffs, or named plaintiffs, remain vulnerable to more or less 
subtle retaliatory steps, where a retaliatory motive is notoriously difficult to 
prove. A prospective litigator may wish to focus on establishing a factual 
basis for a ruling that a given issue is likely to recur and which will evade 
judicial review, thus setting the stage for declaratory relief under chapter 
231A of the General Laws. 
§ 10.5. Support of Prisonen. Although a Sheriff must consent to receive 
a State prisoner, he has no such option with respect to inmates serving 
"House" time. Regardless in which county the house sentence is imposed, 
the sheriff must accept any prisoner sent to him by a court under chapter 
279, section 15. The balance oftrade as concerning the county of sentencing 
versus the county of service has no natural tendencies to reach full bilateral 
settlement. Yet chapter 127, section 125 provides that a sentencing county 
may reimburse the receiving county, and that disputes as to the amount of 
reimbursement fall within the jurisdiction of the superior court sitting in 
either county. 1 Although the legislature in 1946 substituted the word ''may'' 
for "shall," the Supreme Judicial -Court in County Commissioners of 
Franklin v. County Commissioners of Worcester2 minimized the effect of 
the substitution by holding, quite reasonably, that it would be illogical to 
allow the superior court power to resolve a dispute between counties where 
the sentencing county appeared to offer something by way of reimburse-
ment, but not where it offered nothing. 
" See, e.g., Buchannan v. Superintendent of Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Con-
cord, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 549·50, 462 N.E.2d 1802, 1805. 
§ 10.5. • G.L. c. 127, § 125 provides: 
The expense of supporting a prisoner transferred from a jail or house of correction in 
one county to another, removed from the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, 
Bridgewater to a house of correction, or sentenced to a jail or house of correction in a 
county other than that in which he was convicted, may be paid by the county where he 
was sentenced. If the amount to be paid cannot be agreed upon by the county commis-
sioners of the two counties, it may be determined by the superior court sitting in either 
county. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 418 N.E.2d 1251. 
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